The purpose of this monograph is to examine how the Army should best structure the logistical elements of its new Airborne Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to support Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO). With the Army's current focus on becoming a more "Joint and Expeditionary" force with "Campaign Qualities," as well as the supply problems encountered by Army and Marine forces on the drive to Baghdad, logistics has once again come to the forefront. The strains involved in sustaining a parachute-delivered force in hostile territory can serve as an excellent model for just what the Army hopes to accomplish with "expeditionary" logistics. The methodology used in this work is chronological, examining the past, present, and future of airborne sustainment. Data from each of the sections is evaluated against three criteria areas: Logistics Command and Control (C2), Supply Endurance, and Organizational Capability. With these three pillars, the paper delves in key historical events (World War II, Cold War, OIF), doctrine (current and proposed), structure, and ultimately results. The primary conclusion of the work is that there has been a historical underestimation of requirements and overestimation of capabilities, especially in the area of aerial delivery, for sustainment of parachute operations. To overcome these factors, the paper recommends a number of solutions across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, and Personnel (DOTMLPF) spectrum. These include a greater emphasis in doctrine on pushing supplies and logistical assets forward; the production of a Joint manual on JFEO; the creation of a Assault Support Platoon within the various Forward Support Companies; the fielding of improved aerial delivery platforms; and the inclusion of Airborne JFEO facilities in the Joint Sea-Basing concept.