The 1973 Mideast War provided insight into the lethality of modern weapons stems with which the United States may be faced in future conflicts. Of the many lessons learned in the conflict, two lessons have particularly important military implications. New infantry weapons provide the individual ground soldier a significant antitank and anti-aircraft capability. The small, man-portable, antiaircraft missiles, when coupled with more sophisticated air defense weaponry, poise a threat to tactical aircraft which is historically unsurpassed in its implications. This study will address the nature of the Soviet-oriented air defense threat and seek to determine those areas which must be explored in order to increase the survivability of tactical aircraft employed on the modern battlefield. The increased effectiveness of the Soviet air defense system when coupled with the Soviet electronic warfare capability is also discussed. This aspect of the threat may make the current, centralized air control system infeasible. The study concludes that the TACA can contribute to the ground commander's mission in a variety of ways and that the TACA's effectiveness can be enhanced if we expand our concept of how he is to be employed in future conflicts. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the 1973 Mideast War, a discussion of Soviet doctrinal publications, and an analysis of the principles of offensive air support and the TACAs contribution to those principles.