Across the Air Force, Airmen agree that Information Operations (IO) is a topic worthy of our attention, but few Airmen can agree on exactly what IO is. The primary source of this confusion traces back to the very label we are using. The word information in its name implies a direct and exclusive relationship between IO and Information Superiority as well as the Information Domain. Another contributing factor is the persistent confusion between influence capabilities, provided by IO, and influence effects, the essence of all warfare. In the end, reliance on information as the common denominator for this set of capabilities eventually led to IO tribalism within the Air Force and an inefficient "everything is IO" mindset. If Air Force IO is going to provide relevant and useful engagement options to commanders, it must bring specific capabilities to the fight not already clearly defined in our air warfare, space operations, or mobility doctrine. The Air Force made significant progress by streamlining its version of IO in January 2005, but still did not clearly define a replacement for information as the entrance qualifier for IO doctrine. Without a common "glue" to bind these capabilities, IO is simply a conglomeration of unrelated and otherwise orphaned mission areas. This research paper examines IO concept development over the last decade and investigates some of the problems resulting from recent Air Force IO terminology and doctrine.